A Terminological Default Logic

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Abstract

Terminological Logics are knowledge representation formalisms of considerable applicative interest, as they are specifically oriented to the vast class of application domains that are describable by means of taxonomic organizations of complex objects. Although the field of terminological logics has lately been an active area of investigation, few researchers (if any) have addressed the problem of extending these logics with the ability to perform default reasoning. Such extensions would prove of paramount applicative value, as for many application domains a formalization by means of monotonic terminological logics may be accomplished only at the price of oversimplification. In this paper we show how we can effectively integrate terminological reasoning and default reasoning, yielding a terminological default logic. The kind of default reasoning we embed in our terminological logic is reminiscent of Reiter’s Default Logic, but overcomes some of its drawbacks by subscribing to the “implicit” handling of exceptions typical of the Multiple Inheritance Networks with Exceptions proposed by Touretzky and others.

Function: Representation, Taxonomic Reasoning, Default Reasoning, Terminological Logics

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1 Introduction

*Terminological Logics* (TLs, variously known as *Frame Representation Languages* or *Concept Description Languages*) are knowledge representation formalisms of considerable applicative interest, as they are specifically oriented to the vast class of application domains that are describable by means of taxonomic organizations of complex objects.

Unlike better known logics (such as e.g. FOL), the primary syntactic expressions of TLs are *terms*, denoting monadic or dyadic relations on the domain of discourse. In general, the language of a TL consists of a number of term-forming operators by means of which one may build complex terms starting from a basic repertoire of simple terms (*viz.* predicate symbols). By virtue of the semantics of such operators, a partial order is induced on the terms so defined, giving to a terminological KB the characteristic “hierarchical” (or taxonomic) structure of a directed acyclic graph.

The field of TLs has lately been an active area of research, with the attention of researchers especially focusing on the investigation of their logical and computational properties. Nevertheless, few researchers (if any) have addressed the problem of extending these logics with the ability to perform *default reasoning*, a kind of non-monotonic reasoning that is to be applied whenever the rules involved allow for *exceptions*.

Non-monotonic reasoning has been formally addressed in various ways, leading to the development of a variety of formalisms, most of which belong to the offspring of Doyle and McDermott’s Nonmonotonic Logic [3], Reiter’s Default Logic [13] and McCarthy’s Circumscription [8]. Each of these formalisms may be seen as extending FOL with non-monotonic reasoning capabilities of some kind. Given that TLs may be viewed as (pragmatically and computationally interesting subsets of FOL, one might be led to think that a simple integration of default and terminological reasoning could be obtained by simply considering one of the non-monotonic formalisms mentioned above and restricting it to deal with the chosen TL, rather than with FOL *tout court*. Unfortunately, these non-monotonic formalisms, besides having unattractive metalogical and computational properties, suffer from a problem that hinders their use in KR contexts requiring that KB construction be accomplished in an incremental fashion. We call this problem the *Exceptions Explicitation Problem* (EEP).

Incrementality of KB construction is an asset of KB management systems that hardly needs to be argued for. Large KBs are the result of an evolutionary process, both because knowledge entry is a time-consuming process and because knowledge may simply become available at later stages of the process. Also, when a large KB is built by this “stepwise refinement” process, it is highly desirable that the refinement consists in the plain, piece-meal *addition* of new knowledge chunks rather than in a time-consuming *revision* (with possibly ensuing deletion) of pre-existing chunks.

In the full paper [15] we discuss, by means of concrete examples, the EEP and how it manifests itself, for example, in the context of Nonmonotonic Logic (NML) (to this respect, other formalisms such as Default Logic and Circumscription behave in a completely analogous way); we also discuss how the addition of an NML formula to a KB calls for a revision of the pre-existing KB that may in general require repeated calls to the NML
theorem prover, an endeavour that we deem absurd, given the intractability and undecidability of NML. The net effect is that, unless the construction of the KB is realized in a completely static (non incremental) way, the problem of KB construction in NML is in fact an unsolvable problem.

While the general non-monotonic formalisms mentioned above are affected by the EEP, this is not true of the formalisms for Multiple Inheritance Networks with Exceptions (MINEs), a popular, albeit less general, class of non-monotonic KR languages oriented to the representation of taxonomic knowledge (see e.g. [16]). Such languages are less expressive than the more general non-monotonic formalisms mentioned above, in the sense that they only allow for monadic predicate symbols, a limited use of negation and no disjunction at all. For our purposes, it is also essential to observe that their monotonic fragment is far less expressive than TLs as, having no term constructors in their syntactic apparatus, they only allow the definition of taxonomies of simple predicate symbols.

MINEs do not suffer from the EEP because they implement an implicit handling of exceptions by exploiting the partial ordering given by the taxonomy: as a first approximation we can say that, in case of conflicts, a “default rule” \(a \rightarrow b\) is preferred to another default rule \(c \not\rightarrow b\) if the precondition of the first precedes the precondition of the second in the ordering. In other words, the implicit handling of exceptions obeys the so-called specialization principle, according to which “conflicts” are to be solved by preferring the properties belonging to a subclass over those belonging to a superclass.

In this paper we will show how we can effectively extend TLs in such a way that they allow a brand of default reasoning that obeys the specialization principle, thus creating a logic that combines the tools for describing taxonomic organizations of complex objects which are typical of TLs, the ability to describe default information which is typical of general nonmonotonic formalisms, and the incrementality in KB construction which is typical of MINEs. Such an endeavour constitutes perhaps the first completely formal realization of the notion of “frame” as originally proposed by Minsky [9], a notion that was intended to describe a highly structured aggregate of knowledge allowing the description of “prototypical” knowledge and resulting in KBs of “taxonomic” form. We will call our logic \(\mathcal{TDL}^-\) (Terminological Default Logic—the “-” superscript distinguishes it from an earlier version).

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally introduce the syntax and the semantics of the monotonic fragment of \(\mathcal{TDL}^-\). In Section 3 we deal with the non-monotonic part of \(\mathcal{TDL}^-\), describing the notion of “extension” of a set of \(\mathcal{TDL}^-\) formulae (i.e. the set of conclusions that may be derived from these formulae) and some of its properties. In Section 4 we discuss an algorithm that computes an extension of a set of \(\mathcal{TDL}^-\) formulae (when it exists), and discuss the issue of the computational complexity of \(\mathcal{TDL}^-\). For reasons of space, the proofs of the propositions and theorems stated in this paper are omitted; see [15] also for a more detailed account of the logical and computational properties of \(\mathcal{TDL}^-\). Section 5 concludes.
The monotonic fragment of $\text{TDL}^-$

The $\text{TDL}^-$ logic, like many other TLs, allows the specification of three fundamental types of terms: frames, slots and individual constants. Frames (also known as concepts) are terms denoting sets of individuals, and are, so to speak, the first-class citizens of $\text{TDL}^-$. Slots (also known as roles) are terms denoting binary relations between individuals; their function is to allow the specification of structural constituents of frames. Individual constants denote individuals of the domain of discourse. For example, the basic repertory of simple terms (called atoms) that are used in order to build more complex terms might contain the frame Polygon, denoting the set of polygons, and the slot Side, denoting all those pairs of individuals $(x, y)$ such that $y$ is one of the sides of $x$; this would allow the definition of more complex frames, such as the term $\forall \text{Side}.\text{Polygon}$, denoting the set of those individuals whose sides are all polygons (i.e. the set of polyhedra), and to subsequently define other frames by using those defined before.

In order to introduce the syntax of $\text{TDL}^-$ we will need three disjoint alphabets: an alphabet $I$ of individual constants (with metavariables $i, i_1, i_2, \ldots$), an alphabet $MP$ of monadic predicate symbols (with metavariables $M, M_1, M_2, \ldots$) and an alphabet $DP$ of dyadic predicate symbols (with metavariables $D, D_1, D_2, \ldots$). The syntax of $\text{TDL}^-$ is specified by the following definition.

**Definition 1** A frame in $\text{TDL}^-$ is defined by the following syntax:

$$
F_1, F_2 \to F_1 \cap F_2 \mid M \mid \neg M \mid \forall S.F_1 \mid \bot \mid \top
$$

We will use metavariables $F, F_1, F_2, \ldots$ ranging on frames and metavariables $S, S_1, S_2, \ldots$ ranging on slots.

Let us now switch to the formal semantics of $\text{TDL}^-$ frames. The meaning of the linguistic constructs introduced above may be given in terms of the notion of extension function.

**Definition 2** An interpretation $I$ over a nonempty set of individuals $D$ is a function that maps elements of $MP$ into subsets of $D$, elements of $DP$ into subsets of $D \times D$, and elements of $I$ into elements of $D$ such that $I(i_1) \neq I(i_2)$ whenever $i_1 \neq i_2$. We will say that $I$ is an extension function iff $I(\bot) = \emptyset$, $I(\top) = D$, $I(\neg M) = D \setminus I(M)$, $I(F_1 \cap F_2) = I(F_1) \cap I(F_2)$, $I(\forall S.F) = \{x \in D \mid \forall y : (x, y) \in I(S) \Rightarrow y \in I(F)\}$.

We next introduce a feature of the language that allows us to associate names to complex frames, with the net effect that we will be able to define new frames using names instead of the corresponding complex frames.

**Definition 3** A naming is an expression of the form $M \equiv F$ or of the form $M \prec F$, where $F$ is a frame and $M$ an element of $MP$. An extension function $I$ over a nonempty domain $D$ satisfies a naming $\delta$ iff $I(M) = I(F)$ if $\delta = M \equiv F$, and $I(M) \subseteq I(F)$ if $\delta = M \prec F$. 

3
Namings of type $M = F$ define necessary and sufficient conditions for an individual to be in the extension of $M$, while the conditions defined by namings of type $M \prec F$ are necessary but not sufficient.

Our language also allows the expression of assertions, stating that individual constants are instances of frames and pairs of individual constants are instances of slots.

**Definition 4** An assertion is an expression of the form $i_1:F$ or $(i_1, i_2):S$, where $i_1, i_2$ are individual constants, $F$ is a frame and $S$ is a slot. An extension function $\mathcal{I}$ over a nonempty domain $\mathcal{D}$ satisfies an assertion $\alpha$ iff $\mathcal{I}(i_1) \in \mathcal{I}(F)$ if $\alpha = i_1:F$ and $(\mathcal{I}(i_1), \mathcal{I}(i_2)) \in \mathcal{I}(S)$ if $\alpha = (i_1, i_2):S$.

The notion of satisfiability of a $T$-set (i.e. of a set of namings and assertions), and that of a model of a $T$-set may be defined in the obvious way (see [13]).

**Definition 5** Let $\Omega$ be a satisfiable $T$-set, and let $M_1, M_2$ be two elements of $MP$. We say that $M_1$ is subsumed by $M_2$ in $\Omega$ (written $M_1 \preceq_\Omega M_2$) iff for every model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\Omega$ it is true that $\mathcal{I}(M_1) \subseteq \mathcal{I}(M_2)$. We say that $\Omega$ logically implies an assertion $\alpha$ (written $\Omega \models \alpha$) iff $\alpha$ is satisfied by all models of $\Omega$.

The following definition formalizes what namings and assertions follow from a $T$-set $\Omega$.

**Definition 6** Let $\Omega$ be a satisfiable $T$-set. The transitive closure of $\Omega$ (written $TC(\Omega)$) is the set $\Omega \cup \{ \alpha \mid \Omega \models \alpha \}$.

Observe that $\models$ is defined for assertions only: this means that a set $\Omega$ differs from $TC(\Omega)$ only in the assertions it contains. It is easy to show that $TC$ is monotonic (i.e. if $\Omega \subseteq \Omega'$, then $TC(\Omega) \subseteq TC(\Omega')$), and that $TC$ is in fact a closure (i.e. $TC(\Omega) = TC(TC(\Omega))$).

### 3 Default reasoning in $TDL^-$

Up to now we have described the monotonic fragment of $TDL^-$. Let us now discuss the addition of non-monotonic features.

**Definition 7** A default is an expression of the form $M \rightsquigarrow S.F$, where $M$ is an element of $MP$, $S$ is a slot and $F$ is a frame.

Informally, $M \rightsquigarrow S.F$ means: “if $i$ is an $M$ such that $i'$ is an $S$-filler of $i$ and the assumption that $i'$ is a $F$ does not lead to a contradiction, assume it”. For example, the default $IU \rightsquigarrow FM.I$ means: “if $i$ is an Italian university and $i'$ is a faculty member of it and the assumption that $i'$ is Italian does not lead to a contradiction (i.e. we do not know that he is not an Italian), assume it”.

The particular syntax we have chosen for defaults is due to the following reasons:
1. an analysis of the literature concerning the interaction between frames and default knowledge, ranging from the more informal and impressionistic proposals (such as those of e.g. [9, 14]) to more formally justified ones [2, 11], reveals that default rules with consequents in a “slot-filler” form have always been identified as the most natural way in which to convey default frame-like knowledge;

2. this type of default rules are sufficient to highlight the problems resulting from the interaction between default knowledge and terminological knowledge; on the other hand, the extension to other forms of defaults (such as e.g. those involving numeric restrictions) is conceptually easy, but does not teach us much with respect to the issue of the integration between default and terminological reasoning.

We may now define what we mean by a $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory.

**Definition 8** A $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory is a pair $\mathcal{T} = (\Psi, \Delta)$, where $\Psi$ is a satisfiable finite $T$-set, and $\Delta$ is a finite set of defaults.

We are now able to define what the *extensions* of a $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory are. Informally, by the term “extension” we mean the set of assertions and namings that we can reasonably believe to be true as a consequence of the theory. For instance, if we knew that the University of Bellosuardo is an Italian university, that Professor Dolcevita is a faculty member thereof, and that the faculty members of Italian universities are typically Italian, we would like to conclude (formally: to be included in the corresponding extension) that Dolcevita is an Italian.

Our definition of “extension” is similar to the one given by Reiter for Default Logic, i.e. an extension is a fixpoint of a consequence relation. However, unlike in Default Logic, the specialization principle is “wired” in our definition: in the presence of conflicting defaults, the one with the more specific premise will be preferred. For instance, suppose that, besides the fact that the faculty members of Italian universities are typically Italian, we also knew that the faculty members of South Tyrolean universities are typically not Italian; knowing that South Tyrolean universities are Italian universities\(^1\), that the University of Pflundes is a South Tyrolean university, and that Professor Katzenjammer is a faculty member thereof, we will be able to derive, as desired, that Katzenjammer is not Italian. Such a conclusion could not be drawn if we simply confined ourselves to employing the terminological subset of Default Logic (or, for that matter, of any general non-monotonic formalism): the specialization principle embodied in Definition 9 plays a critical role in the inferential behaviour displayed by our formalism.

**Definition 9** Let $\mathcal{T} = (\Psi, \Delta)$ be a $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory. Let $\Gamma$ be an operator such that, for any satisfiable $T$-set $\Omega$, $\Gamma(\Omega, \mathcal{T})$ is the smallest satisfiable $T$-set satisfying the following closure conditions:

1. $\Psi \subseteq \Gamma(\Omega, \mathcal{T})$;

\(^1\)South Tyrol is, in fact, a German-speaking region of Italy.
2. $\Gamma(\Omega, T) = TC(\Gamma(\Omega, T))$;

3. for all defaults $M_1 \Rightarrow S.F_1 \in \Delta$, for all assertions $i_1:M_1 \in \Gamma(\Omega, T)$ such that $(i_1, i_2):S \in \Gamma(\Omega, T)$, it happens that $i_2:F_1 \in \Gamma(\Omega, T)$, unless there exists an atom $M_2$ such that

   (a) $i_1:M_2 \in \Omega$ and $M_2 \not\preceq \Omega M_1$;
   (b) $M_2 \Rightarrow S.F_2 \in \Delta$;
   (c) $\Omega \cup \{i_2:F_1 \sqcap F_2\}$ is unsatisfiable.

A satisfiable $T$-set $E$ is an extension of the $TDL^-$ theory $T$ iff $E = \Gamma(E, T)$, i.e. iff $E$ is a fixpoint of the operator $\Gamma$.

Conditions 1 and 2 are obviously to be satisfied if we want “extensions” to be “sets of conclusions” according to the sense generally accepted in KR. Condition 3 embodies the specialization principle: if a default $M_1 \Rightarrow S.F_1$ is “applicable” and (Conditions 3a, 3b, 3c) there is no evidence contradicting the conclusion of the default (i.e. $i_1$ does not belong to any subclass of $M_1$ which is the premise of a default whose conclusion would be inconsistent with $F_1$), then the default may be safely applied and the conclusion drawn.

We now consider an example to show how Definition 9 works, and, in particular, how $TDL^-$ employs an implicit handling of exceptions.

**Example 1** Let $\mathcal{T} = \langle \Psi, \Delta \rangle$ be the $TDL^-$ theory that formalizes our “Professors” example, with $\Psi = \{b: IU, \langle b, d\rangle: FM, p: STU, \langle p, k\rangle: FM, STU < IU\}$ and $\Delta = \{IU \Rightarrow FM, I, STU \Rightarrow FM, \neg I\}$. Let $\mathcal{E} = TC(\Psi \cup \{k: \neg I, d: I\})$ and $\Gamma(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{T}) = \mathcal{E}$. It is not hard to show (see [15]) that $\Gamma(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{T})$ satisfies the conditions of Definition 9; therefore $\mathcal{E}$ is an extension of $\mathcal{T}$.

It is important to observe that the same example may be formalized, for example, in Nonmonotonic Logic, only at the price of a cumbersome operation of “exceptions explicitation”, i.e. by imposing the following set of axioms.

\[
\forall x \forall y \; IU(x) \land FM(x, y) \land M[I(y) \land \neg STU(x)] \Rightarrow I(y) \quad (1)
\]

\[
\forall x \; STU(x) \Rightarrow IU(x) \quad (2)
\]

\[
\forall x \forall y \; STU(x) \land FM(x, y) \land M[\neg I(y)] \Rightarrow \neg I(y) \quad (3)
\]

\[
IU(b) \land FM(b, d) \land STU(p) \land FM(p, k) \quad (4)
\]

As Axiom 1 shows, in NML we must make explicit the fact that a South Tyrolean university is an exceptional Italian university relatively to the citizenship of its faculty members; in $TDL^-$ this is not necessary, and, as hinted in Section 1, this allows KB update to be completely additive.

In [15] we use Example 1 to show that $TDL^-$ is in fact non-monotonic.

We go on to discuss some properties of the notion of extension as formalized in Definition 9. The following proposition parallels the one given by Reiter for Default Logic, stating that extensions are “maximal” sets.
Proposition 1 Let \( T = \langle \Psi, \Delta \rangle \) be a \( TDL^- \) theory, and let \( \mathcal{E}_1 \) and \( \mathcal{E}_2 \) be extensions of \( T \). If \( \mathcal{E}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{E}_2 \), then \( \mathcal{E}_1 = \mathcal{E}_2 \).

Similarly to what happens in most non-monotonic formalisms, some \( TDL^- \) theories have more than one extension; in particular, the number of extensions can be exponential with respect to the size of the \( TDL^- \) theory, as the following proposition shows.

Proposition 2 There exists a \( TDL^- \) theory \( T \) such that the number of extensions of \( T \) is exponential with respect to the size of \( T \).

This proposition is proven by showing that there exists a \( TDL^- \) theory \( T \) that contains \( O(|T|^2) \) “Nixon Diamonds”, which leads to the existence of \( O(2|T|^2) \) extensions. Although the number of extensions can be very large in the worst case, this need not be the case in actual KBs. Furthermore, this exponential number of extensions is not a characteristic of \( TDL^- \) itself, but is common to all standard non-monotonic formalisms: the “Multiple Nixon Diamond” can be easily formulated in these formalisms, giving rise to the same phenomenon.

Unfortunately, some \( TDL^- \) theories may not have extensions.

Proposition 3 There exists a \( TDL^- \) theory with no extensions.

This is proven by showing that the sample theory \( T = \langle \Psi, \Delta \rangle \), with \( \Psi = \{ \text{a} \rightarrow \text{A}, \langle \text{a}, \text{a} \rangle ; \text{S} \rightarrow \text{B} \land \text{C}, \text{D} \rightarrow \text{B} \land \text{C} \lor \text{E} \} \) and \( \Delta = \{ \text{A} \rightarrow \text{S} \cdot \text{E}, \text{D} \rightarrow \text{S} \cdot \bot \} \), has no extensions. In [15] we argue that it would not be easy to find sublanguages of \( TDL^- \) such that the existence of at least one extension is always guaranteed: in fact, removing from \( TDL^- \) the causes that are responsible for the non-existence of an extension for theory \( T \) would dramatically curtail the expressive power of the language itself.

4 Computing an extension of a \( TDL^- \) theory

In this section we will discuss the properties of the EXT (nondeterministic) algorithm that computes (when it exists) an extension of a \( TDL^- \) theory.

EXT is heavily dependent on the decision of the monotonic fragment of \( TDL^- \), i.e. of the \( \preceq_{\Omega} \) and \( \models \) relations. It is well-known (see [6]) that in most TLs (and the monotonic fragment of \( TDL^- \) is no exception), deciding \( \preceq_{\Omega} \) can be reduced to the decision of \( \models \), and that the decision of \( \models \) can in turn be reduced to deciding unsatisfiability.

There exists a well-known technique, based on constraint propagation (see [6]), for deciding unsatisfiability in TLs. By using this technique, it may be shown that it is decidable whether a finite and “acyclic” \( T \)-set (i.e. a \( T \)-set that contains no namings in which the \textit{definiendum} is defined in terms of itself) is unsatisfiable. By considering acyclic \( TDL^- \) theories only, we can profitably exploit this result.

\(^2\)The unsatisfiability problem is the problem of deciding if a \( T \)-set \( \Omega \) is unsatisfiable.
Definition 10 Let $T = \langle \Psi, \Delta \rangle$ be a $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory. Then $T$ is acyclic iff $\Phi = \{ \tau | \tau \text{ is a naming in } \Psi \} \cup \{ M < F : M \mapsto S.F \in \Delta \}$ is acyclic.

In [15] we present the EXT algorithm for computing an extension of an acyclic $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory by a series of successive approximations $\Omega_i$. If two successive approximations are the same set $\Omega_n$, the algorithm is said to converge, and $\Omega_n$ is a finite and acyclic $T$-set such that $TC(\Omega_n)$ is an extension of the theory. EXT contains a loop inside which a nondeterministic choice is made of which default to consider for expansion. Generality requires this nondeterminism, since $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theories need not have unique extensions.

The following correctness and completeness theorem states that all and only the extensions of a $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory $T$ can be computed by the algorithm.

Theorem 1 Let $T = \langle \Psi, \Delta \rangle$ be an acyclic $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory. $E$ is an extension of $T$ iff the application of the EXT algorithm to $T$ has a converging computation such that $\Omega_n = \Omega_{n-1}$ and $TC(\Omega_n) = E$.

The following is an example of a non-converging computation.

Example 2 Consider the acyclic $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory $T$ of Proposition 3. It turns out that each approximation $\Omega_i$ is such that $\Omega_{2k} = \Psi$ and $\Omega_{2k+1} = \Psi \cup \{ a : E \}$, for each $k \geq 0$. Therefore $\Omega_{2k} \neq \Omega_{2k+1}$ for each $k \geq 0$, and the computation never stops.

The next corollary follows from Theorem 1.

Corollary 1 The set of extensions of an acyclic $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory is recursively enumerable.

Finally, we discuss some issues related to the computational complexity of $\mathcal{TDL}^-$. To this respect, it is fundamental to observe that, if we add an assertion $\alpha$ to $\Omega$, $\preceq_{\Omega}$ does not change, as the following proposition states.

Proposition 4 Let $\Omega$ be a $T$-set in $\mathcal{TDL}^-$, $M_1$ and $M_2$ two elements of $MP$, and $\alpha$ an assertion. Then $M_1 \preceq_{\Omega \cup \{ \alpha \}} M_2$ iff $M_1 \preceq_{\Omega} M_2$.

This also means that, if we want to compute an extension of a $\mathcal{TDL}^-$ theory $T = \langle \Psi, \Delta \rangle$, it suffices to compute $\preceq_{\Psi}$ at the beginning of the computation, once for all. Unfortunately, deciding $\preceq_{\Psi}$ is $\text{co}$-$\text{NP}$-complete, as shown in [12]. Luckily, this is a worst case behaviour that seldom occurs: if we make some reasonable assumptions (see [12]) on the form of $\Psi$, it can be shown [15] that checking if $M_1 \preceq_{\Psi} M_2$ holds is computable in $O(s \log s)$, where $s = |\Psi|$.
5 Conclusion

In this paper we have shown how we can extend terminological logics in such a way that they allow a brand of default reasoning that obeys the specialization principle, thus creating a formalism (which we have dubbed $TDL^-$) that combines the tools for describing taxonomic organizations of complex objects which are typical of TLs, the ability to describe default information which is typical of general nonmonotonic formalisms, and the incrementality in KB construction which is typical of MINEs.

This has been obtained by relying on the notion of “extension of a $TDL^-$ theory”, a notion that has been defined in the style pioneered by Reiter in his Default Logic, i.e. as a fixpoint of a consequence relation. We have also studied a number of properties of $TDL^-$ related to issues such as the existence and the uniqueness of extensions, and the complexity of $TDL^-$ reasoning.

The language of $TDL^-$ has been designed with the aim of providing a minimal framework allowing to study the interaction of terminological and default information in a meaningful way. Quite obviously, extensions to this framework may be conceived that enable the expression of default information of a nature different from the one considered here.

References


